The Stubbornness of Pretexts by Yeager, Daniel Y.




The Stubbornness of Pretexts 
DANIEL B. YEAGER* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 611 
II.  WHAT IS A PRETEXT? ........................................................................................ 612 
III.  PRETEXTUAL POLICE ACTION ............................................................................ 617 
 A. Whren v. United States ............................................................................ 617 
 B. Pretextual or Unconstitutional?  How to Tell the Difference .................. 622 
 C. The Role of Intentions in Fourth Amendment Analysis ............................ 628 
IV.   ARKANSAS V. SULLIVAN: CONFRONTING THE REMNANTS OF WHREN ...................... 634 
V.    CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 642 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On May 29, 2001, the United States Supreme Court decided Arkansas 
v. Sullivan,1 a seemingly unremarkable per curiam opinion that facilitated 
the conviction of a small time methamphetamine dealer whose trial had 
been aborted by pretrial rulings that were affirmed by his state’s highest 
court.2  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, ruling that in suppressing 
Sullivan’s drugs, the state court had ruled “flatly contrary to this Court’s 
controlling precedent,”3 Whren v. United States.4  Five years earlier, 
Whren had confronted the very question before the Court in Sullivan: 
 
 *  Professor, California Western School of Law. 
 1. 532 U.S. 769 (2001) (per curiam). 
 2. State v. Sullivan, 11 S.W.3d 526 (Ark. 2000), opinion supplemented on denial 
of reh’g, 16 S.W.3d 551 (Ark. 2000), and rev’d, Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 
(2001). 
 3. Sullivan, 532 U.S. at 771. 
 4. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
YEAGER3.DOC 1/14/2020  4:04 PM 
 
612 
Does the Fourth Amendment’s injunction against unreasonable searches 
and seizures prevent the prosecution from using evidence that police 
discovered by way of a so-called “pretext”?  Whren held that it does not; 
Sullivan followed suit.5 
The pretext problem had been percolating in the U.S. Supreme Court 
for at least four decades before its putative burial in 1996 by Whren.6  
Indeed, it is one of those areas of criminal procedure where the term 
“confused patchwork,”7 to lift a term of Justice White’s, would be apt.  
“Pretext” refers to an action that was done for fishy reasons.  In other 
words, calling something “a pretext” is not so much a criticism of the 
action as it is of its motive.  And while in just seven years Whren already 
has been cited over one thousand times in court opinions and has been 
the central subject of some fifty law review articles,8 the criteria of 
pretexts seem to be taken as given; it is their consequences that get all 
the play.  Because no agreement on what those criteria are has been 
reached, I hope to establish them here.  This Article, therefore, will reflect 
on (1) how Whren’s failure to acknowledge what counts as a pretext 
accounts for the residual confusion as to whether or not Whren really has 
killed off the pretext argument in constitutional criminal procedure, and 
(2) the extent to which the Court in Sullivan compounded that failure, 
which I hope to lightly correct here by distinguishing motives from 
intentions and then by elaborating the role that each plays, or at least should 
play, in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
II.  WHAT IS A PRETEXT? 
Consider Jean-Paul Sartre’s use of the term “pretext” in the following 
garden-variety example, which appears in his autobiography: 
By classifying authors in order of merit, he was paying lip-service; this surface 
hierarchy ill concealed his preferences, which were utilitarian: de Maupassant 
provided the best translation material for his German pupils; Goethe, beating 
Gottfried Keller by a nose, could not be equalled for compositions in French. As 
a humanist, my grandfather held novels in low esteem; as a teacher, he valued 
them because of their vocabulary. He ended by reading only selected passages, 
 
 5. Sullivan, 532 U.S. at 771; Whren, 517 U.S. at 819. 
 6. See, e.g., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).  There is a brief 
reference even earlier.  See United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932) (“An 
arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence.”). 
 7. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 649 (1993) (White, J., dissenting) 
(describing the Court’s federal habeas corpus cases). 
 8. See, e.g., Timothy P. O’Neill, Beyond Privacy, Beyond Probable Cause, 
Beyond the Fourth Amendment: New Strategies for Fighting Pretext Arrests, 69 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 693, 694 & n.7 (1998) (citing articles discussing pretext arrests).  Among 
the more frequently cited is David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other 
Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997). 
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and I saw him, some years later, enjoy an extract from Madame Bovary in 
Mironneau’s Readings when the complete Flaubert had been awaiting his 
pleasure for twenty years.  I felt that he lived on the dead, which to some degree 
complicated my relations with them.  Under the pretext of worshipping them, he 
kept them in chains and did not refrain from cutting them up in order to carry 
them more conveniently from one language to another.9 
Here, Sartre’s grandfather, Charles Schweitzer, is depicted as someone 
whose action in question is his classifying authors in their order of merit.  
What makes it a pretext is that the reason, if any, one would ordinarily 
have for doing so would be the authors’ imagination, their compassion, 
their expressiveness, not their tendency to make teaching a foreign language 
easier.  And how do we conclude that Grandfather Schweitzer’s rankings 
were pretextual?  The most telling evidence here is the shakiness of his 
claim to classification by merit in light of the fact that young Sartre 
observed that his grandfather had a practice of citing canonical works, 
but never settling down to actually read them.10  That is to say, Grandfather 
Schweitzer used the great works, but not because they were great.  Instead, 
his real reasons for the classification by merit might have been to 
conceal from his grandson his lowbrow tastes, his preference for minor 
authors, or that what he liked about the great authors was not that they were 
great authors but that their books were somehow useful to his trade. 
It is important to note that Sartre points out that his grandfather’s real 
interest in the great authors was “ill concealed.”  Ill concealed or not, it was 
concealed, or at least it was meant to be concealed.  If Grandfather 
Schweitzer had admitted that his rankings were not really based on 
merit, then the claim that the classification by merit was pretextual would 
be empty, given that a pretext is an action that is characterized by a 
special sort of underlying reason, a reason at odds with those reasons, if 
any, that ordinarily provide the grounds for the action.  If Grandfather 
Schweitzer owned up to classifying authors by their vocabulary, then 
there would be no appearance to penetrate; there would be no special 
reason at odds with or underlying the action.  We would just say: 
“Grandfather classifies authors by their vocabulary.”  The action would 
not be pretextual. 
 
 9. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, THE WORDS 65–66 (Bernard Frechtman trans., 1964) 
(emphasis added). 
 10. Earlier in the text, when Grandfather Schweitzer complains that he does not 
comprehend a text, his wife explains that his failure is due to the fact that he reads from 
the middle, not the beginning, of a text.  Id. at 43. 
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The same would be true of young Sartre, who calls his grandfather’s 
ranking “pretextual.”  Because Sartre does in fact read the canonical 
works, we have no occasion to question why he would rank the great 
authors as he does; there would be nothing to suggest that his 
classification is not by merit.  When he ranks by merit, there is very 
likely no motive for the action at all, given that motives exist only when 
the reasons for the action are at odds with the action in some way.  With 
the ordinary action, there may be no answer at all to the question: “Why 
did you do that?”  With pretextual action, oppositely, there is an answer.  
If there were not, then the term “pretext” would have no specific 
application to the speech situation. 
So too, if the classification was not by merit, then the whole notion of 
pretext would be inapposite.  In other words, pretext presupposes here that it 
really is a classification by merit.  If it is a classification by ease of translation 
or breadth of vocabulary, then it is not a pretextual classification by 
merit, but not a classification by merit at all.  Pretext, properly understood, 
operates only in settings where the criteria for the action are met: it is a 
classification by merit.  The best authors are intentionally rated or placed 
at the top. 
In the hope of correcting one of the great misconceptions or abuses of 
the term “pretext,” it bears repeating that to say that the action claimed 
(here, classification by merit) is not the action that occurred (here, 
classification by vocabulary) is not to describe the action as pretextual, 
except in a too loose or extravagant sense.  With pretexts, the action is 
not feigned.  What is concealed is a special reason, a motive, which, like 
all motives, cuts against or deviates from the action; what is concealed is 
something in the world to be achieved or set up by the action, something 
that normally would not strike someone as the upshot of the action. 
Soon after the term’s first appearance, Sartre uses the term “pretext” 
again.  This time, Sartre imagines himself riding a train without having 
purchased a ticket.  In this reverie, he deflects the ticket collector’s 
demands for a ticket by reversing the situation: 
I therefore revealed that I had to be in Dijon for important and secret reasons, 
reasons that concerned France and perhaps all mankind.  If things were viewed 
in this new light, it would be apparent that no one in the entire train had as much 
right as I to occupy a seat.  Of course, this involved a higher law which 
conflicted with the regulations, but if the ticket-collector took it upon himself to 
interrupt my journey, he would cause grave complications, the consequences of 
which would be his responsibility.  I urged him to think it over: was it 
reasonable to doom the entire species to disorder under the pretext of 
maintaining order in a train?11 
 
 11. SARTRE, supra note 9, at 111 (emphasis added). 
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Here, one would ask this question: If maintaining order on the train by 
insisting that passengers have tickets is a pretext, then what was the 
ticket collector really getting at?  For pretext to be used in anything but a 
loose sense, the answer would have to be that the ticket collector was 
demanding a ticket in order to doom the entire species while holding 
himself out as maintaining order.  But here the evidence is weak.  Even if 
the ticket collector believed Sartre’s claim about the fate of mankind, that 
does not necessarily mean that demanding the ticket anyway demonstrates 
an intention to doom the species.  Even once alerted to what is staked in 
demanding the ticket, that stake (dooming the species) could still remain 
incidental to the ticket collector’s original plan of maintaining order or 
enforcing the regulations or doing his job.  As long as he demands the 
ticket despite the fact that it will doom the species, rather than in order to 
doom the species, then maintaining order or enforcing the regulations or 
doing his job would not be a pretext at all.  Instead, that would be 
precisely the point or upshot of demanding the ticket. 
A pretext, therefore, is a criticism we make of an action that has a 
motive that is, like all motives, at odds in some way with the action: the 
motive for the generous action toward the fragile relative is to inherit 
under the will.  The motive could be greed (because greed is directed at 
something—here, at the money that the will would make available).  If 
the generous action is just plain generous without such directedness, 
then it is nonsense to speak in terms of motive, though there may be 
reasons for the generosity (for example, feeling good about oneself).  
But such reasons are not motives if they are psychological or inner,12 
even though we tend to think of motives as inner states rather than as 
explanations of something to be attained in the world by a certain course 
of action.13  And while it is common among psychologists to suggest that 
all actions have motives (or are motivated),14 in fact we use the word 
“motive” only infrequently in ordinary speech.15  We use the word only 
in reference to actions we feel the need to assess, to make sense of.16  
 
 12. See Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the 
Mixed Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17, 72–73 
(1991). 
 13. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 565 (1968) (White, J., 
dissenting) (“[S]ending state and federal courts on an expedition into the minds of police 
officers would produce a grave and fruitless misallocation of judicial resources.”). 
 14. R.S. PETERS, THE CONCEPT OF MOTIVATION 31 (R.F. Holland ed., 1958). 
 15. Id. at 28; N.S. Sutherland, Motives as Explanations, 68 MIND 145, 153 (1959). 
 16. PETERS, supra note 14, at 29. 
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Among those actions that do have reasons, not all reasons are necessarily 
directed.  Considerateness or punctuality, for example, are reasons for 
actions, yet they are not motives; they have no aim, no directedness; they 
are not setting anything up.17 
Thus, references to motives come up in moral discourse where we 
need to make sense of an action.  If we say, “What was his motive?” it 
must be because it looks to us as though the action had to be directed at 
something unusual or untoward, but we cannot figure out what it was.  
When we say that Macbeth’s motive in killing Duncan was ambition, we 
are not referring to a feeling or some internal perturbation of Macbeth;18 
instead, the motive of ambition refers to some other actions, some other 
ends in the world to be attained by the killing, whether or not the actions 
are known to him.19  Likewise, “if a man looks pleased when praised for 
something trivial, or upset when mildly criticized, we can say he is vain, 
but we cannot say vanity is his motive for being pleased when praised.”20  
In other words, vanity may explain certain actions, but it cannot be 
considered a motive for them.21  Pretext is therefore an inquiry into a 
motive that the actor is covering up.  Any actor, once put on the spot by 
being questioned about his motives, will either confirm or dispel our 
suspicions by going on record and offering a reason for the action or 
denying having any reason at all.  If we accept that the action had no 
motive, or perhaps had no reason whatsoever (as in “I just did it” or “I 
just felt like doing it”),22 then the action cannot be pretextual.  Thus 
“pretext” is the term we apply to an action that we conclude was directed 
in an unconventional or untoward way that the actor was aware of, 
regardless of whether he is willing to admit to it when questioned later.  
Put slightly differently, if after confronting the explanation for the 
action, we cannot accept the action as ordinary or conventional, then we 
may be inclined to call it a pretext.  For example, we may say: “Your 
motive in marrying her was greed; you married her for her money.”  If 
the accused in such a pinch were to respond: “No, I married for love,” to 
that we may respond: “No, you are incapable of love.  The marriage is for 
you just a pretext for moneymaking.”  That is to say, love is the conventional, 
ordinary reason for marriage, but it is not the reason for this one.  
Accordingly, in its most boiled down form, pretext is a way of criticizing 
an action that had a motive that is incompatible with the ordinary, 
conventional reasons, if any, for the action. 
 
 17. Id. at 32. 
 18. Gudel, supra note 12, at 73. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See ROY LAWRENCE, MOTIVE AND INTENTION 23 (1972). 
 22. Gudel, supra note 12, at 75. 
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III.  PRETEXTUAL POLICE ACTION 
Likewise, pretextual police action occurs when police do the right thing 
for the wrong reasons;23 they perform a lawful action with an improper 
motive.  For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a search of an 
arrestee follows automatically from a lawful arrest.24  This bright line rule 
is meant to prevent the destruction of evidence and to protect the arresting 
officers from weapons within the arrestee’s reach.25  But what happens if 
an officer arrests and searches someone who has violated a law against, 
say, public drunkenness, when the officer’s motive in arresting—the 
whole upshot of the police action—is to look for obscene materials in the 
arrestee’s satchel? 
Defense attorneys plausibly insist that obscene materials or other evidence 
of crime found on the arrestee should be suppressed on grounds of pretext, 
sham, or bad faith.26  The suppression hearing, their argument runs, should 
demand from the arresting officer an account of his reasons for his actions: 
“Why did you arrest that person then?  You had no interest at all in 
enforcing the public drunkenness laws, did you?”27  It is the trial judge’s 
job, under such a view, to decide whether the officer did the right thing 
(arrest a drunk) for the wrong reason (to search for obscene materials).  If 
the officer did arrest the drunk just to explore for obscene materials, 
defense attorneys have long argued that the trial judge should invalidate 
the otherwise lawful police action on grounds of pretext.28  Invalidating 
the arrest would be to hold it unconstitutional, thereby justifying the 
exclusion of the evidence, if any, “come at by exploitation of that illegality.”29 
A. Whren v. United States 
The viability of this defense strategy culminated seven years ago in 
Whren v. United States.30  In Whren, an unmarked police car containing 
two officers and an investigator stopped two African-American youths 
 
 23. See John M. Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 101 (1982). 
 24. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Burkoff, supra note 23, at 72–84. 
 27. See James B. Haddad, Pretextual Fourth Amendment Activity: Another 
Viewpoint, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 639, 641–43 (1985). 
 28. See id. at 644–46. 
 29. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (quoting JOHN MACARTHUR 
MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959)). 
 30. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
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in a Nissan Pathfinder for some trivial traffic offenses.31 In effecting the 
stop, police peered into the truck and saw in passenger Michael Whren’s 
lap some cocaine that was later used to convict him and driver James 
Brown of serious drug, not traffic, offenses.32  Because it was 
plainclothes vice-squad officers in an unmarked car enforcing the District 
of Columbia’s traffic laws—an action that their own departmental 
regulations prohibited—Whren and Brown insisted that the traffic stop 
was a mere pretext.33  The traffic stop, the officers indicated, was a 
pretext for a drug investigation that could not have warranted the car 
stop based merely on the officers’ flimsy (but accurate) hunch that drug 
activity was afoot. 
Though the case made it all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, it is 
unclear just what the parties or the courts take to be the criteria of 
pretexts.  For example, in its amicus brief, the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) asserted: “[H]ad the police conducted themselves in 
accordance with the regulation a court could presume, subject to 
rebuttal, that the search was not pretextual.”34  Yet in actuality, it is not 
the search that was even arguably pretextual; it is the traffic stop.  As for 
the relevance of the departmental regulations, as dissonant as this may 
sound, compliance with them would make a stronger, not weaker, case of 
pretext.  That is, police compliance with departmental regulations would 
make easier our concluding that it really was a traffic stop, which is a 
necessary condition of a pretextual traffic stop. 
Most of the fifty minute oral argument in Whren involved discussion 
of a regulation found in the Metropolitan Police Department’s Objectives 
and Policies, which held that plainclothes officers in unmarked cars may 
make traffic stops only when the traffic violation “is so grave as to pose 
an immediate threat to the safety of others.”35  To the petitioners’ 
attorney Lisa Burget Wright, the police who stopped Whren—Officers 
Efrain Soto, Homer Littlejohn, and Investigator Tony Howard36—should 
be held accountable by the Fourth Amendment because reasonable 
 
 31. Id. at 808, 810; see also United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371, 372 (D.C. Cir. 
1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
 32. Whren, 517 U.S. at 808–09.  “Whren was sentenced to 168 months incarceration 
and five years supervised release on count one, 168 months incarceration and ten years 
supervised release on count two, one year imprisonment and one year supervised release 
on each of counts three and four.  All terms were to be served concurrently.”  Whren, 53 
F.3d at 373.  Brown received a nearly identical sentence.  Id. 
 33. Whren, 517 U.S. at 815. 
 34. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union in Support of 
Petitioners at 14 n.6, Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841). 
 35. Whren, 517 U.S. at 815 (citing Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, 
D.C., General Order 303.1, pt.1, Objectives and Policies (A)(2)(a)(4) (Apr. 30, 1992)). 
 36. Whren, 53 F.3d at 372.  The Supreme Court mentions only Officer Soto by 
name.  See Whren, 517 U.S. at 808–10. 
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officers would not have made a stop that their employer precluded them 
from making.37  To this, the Court responded that all the Department 
need do is have the unmarked car ask a marked car to make the stop.38  
The Court’s suggestion, however, would merely make Whren’s concern 
that his stop was pretextual vanish in a puff of smoke.  That is to say, the 
problem would vanish but not be solved, as Attorney Wright had posed 
this question: How should the Fourth Amendment, not the police, respond 
when the police violate their own rules?39 
There is some uneven precedent on point (which could support just 
about any position), which is cited in the Court’s opinion.40  As for 
additional authority on point, it is unclear that either the attorneys or the 
Court maximized the potential payoff that could have been provided by 
a discussion of what Wayne LaFave has been advocating for nearly forty 
years, including in his doctoral dissertation on arrests:41 administrative 
control of discretion.42  His emphasis on the importance of police having 
rules and on courts interpreting breaches of those rules as unreasonable 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment could help get at whether 
police are abusing their discretion, a concern that LaFave has insinuated 
into contemporary discussions of policing.43  But the real payoff of a 
discussion of the fact that Soto, Littlejohn, and Howard deviated from 
departmental regulations lies in its ability to tell us not whether police 
abused their discretion (so what if they did?), but more importantly, to 
tell us what they were doing.  The real relevance of their breaking their 
own regulations, accordingly, is that it is a piece of evidence that bears 
on the issue of what they were actually doing.  An officer’s pulling 
someone over when he lacks the authority to do so does not, without 
more, make the stop a traffic stop, much less a pretextual traffic stop. 
 
 37. See Brief for the Petitioners at 32, Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841); Brief 
of Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of 
Petitioners at 6–7, Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841).  But cf. Brief for the United States 
at 4–7, Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841) (discussing the “purely objective” approach). 
 38. Official Transcript at 13, Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841). 
 39. See id. at 3–29. 
 40. Whren, 517 U.S. at 812–17. 
 41. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO 
CUSTODY (Frank J. Remington ed., 1965); Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by 
Administrative Regulations: The Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies 
in Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 89 MICH. L. REV. 442, 445–46 (1990). 
 42. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.2(e) (3d ed. 1996). 
 43. See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 377–81 (1987) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
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This angle is only adumbrated in the Assistant to the Solicitor 
General’s portion of oral argument, where the interlocutors briefly touch 
on snippets from Soto’s and Littlejohn’s testimonies from the 
suppression hearing in Whren.44  There, Soto testified that the truck was 
stopped at a stop sign for over twenty seconds,45 though earlier, at the 
preliminary hearing, he had said he did not know how long the truck 
waited at the stop.46  And while Soto testified at the suppression hearing 
that the truck failed to signal before turning right,47 he had made no 
mention of that infraction at the preliminary hearing or in the police 
report.48  The only infraction that Soto insisted on throughout the case 
was that the truck “sped off quickly,” presumably after seeing the 
unmarked police car perform a u-turn.49  But even with regard to the 
infraction for speeding, Soto admitted at the suppression hearing that he 
“wasn’t going to issue a ticket to him at all.”50  Rather, he explained, 
“My intention[] was to pull him over and talk to him [about the full time 
and speed violations].”51  As fate would have it, however, departmental 
regulations prohibited oral warnings except under very narrow 
circumstances not present there.52  As for Officer Littlejohn, he never saw 
the stop as a response to any traffic violations at all.  For him, the delay 
at the stop sign gave them reasonable suspicion, though he never came out 
and said that the reasonable suspicion was specifically of drug activity.53 
Although the suppression hearing transcript reveals details that were 
not alluded to in the oral argument, the fact remains that the attorneys’ 
colloquy with the bench brought out not only that the officers acted 
contrary to departmental regulations, but also that (1) the officers were 
neither in agreement nor consistent in their claims that they observed any 
traffic violations, and (2) the officers admitted that they did not intend to 
enforce the traffic laws at all.  And what, exactly, is the relevance of 
these details?  The officers’ deviation from their department’s own rules, 
along with the way they comported themselves during the pursuit and 
stop of the truck (as well as when they went on record about the pursuit 
and stop in subsequent legal proceedings), gives us an account of what 
 
 44. Official Transcript at 38–40, Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841). 
 45. Brief for the Petitioners at 5, Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841). 
 46. Id. at 5 n.5. 
 47. Id. at 6. 
 48. Id. at 6 n.6. 
 49. Id. at 5. 
 50. Id. at 6–7. 
 51. Id. at 7 (second alteration in original). 
 52. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996) (citing Metropolitan Police 
Department, Washington, D.C., General Order 303.1, pt.1, Objectives and Policies 
(A)(2)(a)(4) (Apr. 30, 1992)). 
 53. Official Transcript at 39–40, Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841); Brief for the 
Petitioners at 6 n.7, Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841). 
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they were doing.  To figure out what police were doing is a crucial matter; 
it is much more important than why they were doing it, which is 
potentially interesting but doctrinally irrelevant.  While the Court asked 
the Assistant to the Solicitor General whether “pretextual stops are 
fine,”54 I would agree that certainly they are, provided that there is 
agreement on the grammar of what they are.  The real issue is whether 
this was a constitutional, that is, plain view sighting of drugs pursuant to 
a lawful traffic stop.55 
In upholding the convictions, however, the Court never fully engages 
the real issue, thus replicating the indirection of the oral argument.  
Rather, the Court puts most of its capital into an uninspired attempt at 
distinguishing earlier precedents that had referred to how Fourth 
Amendment doctrine must be fashioned to deter police from pretextual 
searches and seizures of suspects.56  Whatever degree of success the 
Whren Court might have had in attempting to reconcile its prior pretext 
cases, it did succeed in establishing that there is very little room for 
pretext arguments in Fourth Amendment law.57  The conclusion makes 
good sense; what remains opaque is why. 
To be sure, Whren’s argument is hard to take too seriously, given that 
it directs reviewing courts to zero in, not so much on what police were 
doing (enforcing traffic laws? enforcing drug laws? both?), but why they 
were doing it (to make the roads safer? to catch drug dealers? to get 
promoted? to kill time?).  Recall that Attorney Wright argued that what 
justifies a search or seizure is not merely whether police have a certain 
amount of suspicion or knowledge about whether crime is afoot—
“probable cause” in Fourth Amendment terms—but in addition, 
“whether a police officer, acting reasonably, would have made the stop 
for the reason given.”58  Indeed, the implications of suggesting that 
police articulate why they decided to stop a bad driver are potentially 
absurd, leading inexorably to the following: two drivers speeding down 
the street, one of whom police believe (but not strongly enough to justify 
a stop) is also a drug dealer.59  The implication of what Attorney Wright 
 
 54. Official Transcript at 40–41, Whren, 517 U.S. 806  (No. 95-5841). 
 55. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
 56. Whren, 517 U.S. at 811–13. 
 57. Id. at 813. 
 58. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810. 
 59. Haddad, supra note 27, at 690; James B. Haddad, Well-Delineated Exceptions, 
Claims of Sham, and Fourfold Probable Cause, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198, 211 
(1977) [hereinafter Haddad, Well-Delineated Exceptions]. 
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was arguing for Whren and Brown is that, in such circumstances, police 
should be allowed to stop only the speeder whom they do not also 
suspect of some other crime.  In other words, to rule in Whren’s favor 
would leave us with a doctrine which says, at least to a point, that the 
more suspicions you have, the less justification you have to act on 
them.60  This, however, is not to say that Whren had no case, just that he 
could have made a stronger one. 
In dismissing Whren’s suggestion that reviewing courts ask questions 
along these dead end lines (“Why, officer, did you stop that bad 
driver?”), the Court was certainly on the right track in remarking that it 
saw “no realistic alternative to the traditional common-law rule that 
probable cause justifies a search and seizure.”61  And this much is true: 
If Whren really had been driving in violation of D.C. law, then police 
were right to stop him.  Indeed, if police saw him break traffic laws, then 
who cares whether police hoped for or even expected a bonus (be it 
drugs or whatever) to be realized during the stop?  What matters is 
whether they were enforcing the traffic laws, not why. 
B.  Pretextual or Unconstitutional?  How to Tell the Difference 
Certainly the happy part of the Whren opinion is the Court’s insistence 
that probable cause that traffic laws had been violated is the key to any 
evaluation of the constitutionality of the stop and subsequent search of 
the truck.  The unhappy part is that the Court made no effort to establish 
how we would determine that it was the probable cause on which the 
officers were relying when they worked themselves into a position to see 
one62 or two63 baggies of cocaine in Whren’s hands.  Nowhere does the 
Court acknowledge that, even with probable cause to stop the car, police 
still might have performed an unconstitutional seizure to verify a hunch 
about drug activity rather than perform a lawful traffic stop. 
And how would we tell the difference between a lawful traffic stop 
and an unlawful drug investigation?  That depends on whether what the 
officers claim to have done is consistent with what was seen in the 
public, observable world.  In other words, it is at this point that the 
 
 60. See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 253 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting); 
Brief for the United States at 13, Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841) (“[I]t would be 
unreasonable to forbid a police department from focusing its finite resources 
disproportionately on those observed traffic offenders whom officers in the field suspect 
may also be engaged in more serious offenses.”); Haddad, Well-Delineated Exceptions, 
supra note 59, at 211. 
 61. Whren, 517 U.S. at 815–18. 
 62. Officer Littlejohn testified that he saw one bag of cocaine in Whren’s lap.  
Brief for the Petitioners at 8, Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841). 
 63. Officer Soto testified that he saw two bags of cocaine in Whren’s lap.  Id. 
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distinction between intentions and motives, and their roles, should begin 
to reveal itself. Suppose, for example, a case in which officers search a 
house at night under the authority of a daytime-only search warrant, 
discover evidence of crime, and claim later in the litigation that their 
intent in entering the house was to make a warrantless emergency arrest.64  
That the officers did not intend to execute a warrantless emergency arrest is 
demonstrated by the fact that they applied for a search warrant for 
evidence of an illegal distillery, took the warrant to the house, produced 
it before entering, and searched the house after locating the suspect.  
This is not a pretextual, warrantless entry to arrest; it is not a warrantless 
entry to arrest at all because it lacks the characteristics of an action 
directed at arresting rather than searching.  As a result, any evidence obtained 
in the house or on the arrestee’s person should be excluded.65  Indeed, 
this is an unconstitutional warrantless entry to search, even if there was 
probable cause to believe the search victim was a dangerous felon.  Unless 
police conducted themselves at the house in a way that is consistent with 
an intention to rely on the doctrine they now cite as the authority for their 
actions, then it is not so much that police were arresting pretextually (so 
what if they were?), but that they were searching unconstitutionally. 
If it really was a warrantless entry to arrest, then who cares why it was 
performed?  What matters is what the police were doing.  Did they have 
probable cause that a serious crime had been committed?  Did they 
conclude that getting a warrant posed a danger to themselves or the 
public?  Did they enter the premises without a warrant and commit 
themselves in a way that indicated that they were looking to get their 
hands on a dangerous person, not for evidence squirreled away in the 
house?66  If so, then they have performed a lawful, warrantless entry to 
arrest a dangerous criminal, and any reason or motive external to the 
action that they might have had is irrelevant.67 
Once we insinuate the enforcement of traffic laws into the world of the 
Fourth Amendment, however, determining what police really were doing 
 
 64. Haddad, supra note 27, at 655–57 (citing Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 
(1958)).  This hypothetical is based very loosely on Jones, which in actuality was a much 
closer case, far too close to demonstrate much of anything.  There, despite what the 
majority found, police really did have reason to believe that Jones, who they knew was 
running an illegal still, was inside at the time of the entry.  See Jones v. United States, 
357 U.S. 493, 500–03 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
 65. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
 66. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990). 
 67. Id. 
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becomes harder.  Take, for example, the case of a male officer that stops 
an attractive female motorist who comes to suspect that she has been 
stopped for his amusement, not to make the roads safer.  Of course it is 
always open to the officer to invent a traffic offense, but the motorist in 
such a case has worries quite apart from why the traffic stop occurred, that 
is, quite apart from whether it was pretextual.  Indeed, to claim that the 
stop was pretextual is incompatible with a claim that the police later 
invented the justification for the stop.  Although police perjury is far from 
trivial,68 it is an altogether different sort of problem from that of pretexts. 
The only concern here is with suspects whom police do have some 
justification in stopping.  What the motorist who really is a traffic 
offender is expressing when she complains about her encounter with the 
overly friendly officer is either (1) despite facts justifying some police 
action, it is not that justified action which police were really taking, or 
(2) despite facts justifying this police action, the action was motivated by 
social objectives.  While these two objections to what police have done 
tend to be treated as though they are coterminous, they are not. The first 
objection is to call the stop unconstitutional; the second objection is to 
call it pretextual.  Pretexts may be dead or near dead, but the core of 
what many defendants claiming pretext are getting at is not, if only 
because of a snag in distinguishing pretextual from unconstitutional 
police action.  That is, what remains open to defendants who could 
justifiably have been stopped, but who question the conditions of the 
stop anyway, is to argue that police were not doing what they said they 
were doing: their actions (regardless of their motives, if motives there 
be) did not have the intention that police claim at the suppression 
hearing to have had on the street. 
Assuming the motorist was speeding or otherwise violating the traffic 
laws, there must be some procedures that can be used to reveal what this 
officer was putting himself to.  If the officer approached the car and 
asked the driver out for a date, then it was not a pretextual traffic stop; it 
was an unconstitutional one, that is, it was not a traffic stop at all, even 
with probable cause.  It could have been a traffic stop, but the officer 
chose to conduct a social stop instead.  If, however, the officer asked her 
for her license, registration, and proof of insurance before advising her 
of what she had done and issuing her a ticket or warning, then we can 
conclude that the officer acted, in the public, observable world, like 
someone who intended to enforce the traffic code.  In other words, he 
was enforcing the traffic code. 
 
 68. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative 
Lies by the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775 (1997); Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police 
Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037 (1996). 
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When I discussed this issue with some San Diego police officers who had 
been admonished for mixing the personal with the professional in this 
very way, I received a range of responses, which included this one: “So 
you mean that if I give her a ticket first and then ask her out it’s okay, 
but if I ask her out first then it’s not?”  The answer to this is, of course, 
“Yes, from a Fourth Amendment standpoint.”  In other words, there is little 
more we can ask when being asked to take positions on what has occurred 
in the public, observable world than that people act in a way that can be 
reconciled with their claims about their own actions.  (If I am always nice 
to you—I treat you uniformly well, attentively, even tenderly—then it 
makes little difference whether I really like you.) 
Yet to require only that the officer have the intent to rely on the doctrine 
in question may not sufficiently protect against pretexts or abuse of the 
doctrine.  Professor Haddad suggests that when a doctrine is intolerably 
susceptible to abuse—to pretextual police action—the doctrine should be 
fashioned to defend against that susceptibility.69  The Court recognized as 
much in Chimel v. California70 by putting a stop to thorough searches of 
residences incident to the arrest of occupants.71  Before Chimel, officers were 
conducting arrests at suspects’ residences and converting those arrests 
into exploratory searches of the residences without first obtaining search 
warrants.72  The arrests, one could say, were pretextual means of realizing 
the motive of ransacking the house.  Unhappy with the hazards posed by a 
doctrine that permitted such police action—such abuse of the power to 
arrest—the Court limited the permissible scope of a search incident to 
arrest to the arrestee and the area within his immediate reach.73 
This approach, which Haddad dubs “the hard-choice approach,”74 has 
the appeal of avoiding intractable attempts at uncovering the motive or 
motives behind the action, in favor of changing the law in order to take 
away the incentive to stage pretextual police actions.  Take, for example, 
a hypothetical of Haddad’s: 
 
 69. Haddad, supra note 27, at 652–53. 
 70. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
 71. Id. at 764–68. 
 72. See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Harris v. United 
States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947). 
 73. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 764–68. 
 74. Haddad, supra note 27, at 651–53. 
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Suppose that defense counsel claims that the police have executed a dated but 
valid traffic arrest warrant as a pretext to enter a narcotics suspect’s house, 
hoping to discover heroin either in plain view or within the scope of a search 
incident to arrest. 
 One approach would be to narrow the scope of the underlying power: the 
right to enter a home to execute an arrest warrant.  The Supreme Court could 
declare that arrest warrants expire after a certain period of time, at least where 
the police efforts to execute the warrant have lapsed.  Or the Court could make a 
less drastic alteration in fourth amendment law by declaring that after a period 
of time, absent continuous diligent effort to execute a misdemeanor arrest 
warrant, the warrant, though still valid for some purposes, would not authorize 
entry into a suspect’s home.  The Court would reason that if authorities place 
such a low priority on a prompt arrest, the governmental interest does not 
outweigh the individual’s right to be free from police entry into his home at the 
nearly unbridled discretion of the police.75 
In other words, Haddad’s hard-choice approach, which itself is 
traceable to Justice Brennan’s thoughtful dissent in a 1960 case,76 would 
treat the pretext problem as resolvable doctrinally: not by condemning a 
given police search or seizure as pretextual, but by changing the 
background rules against which police act.  Quibbling over whether the 
entry was a pretext fails to tell us much, even if the real reason for the 
action (why the officer was doing that) rather than what the action was 
(the intention of the action) was easily accessible to us.  Accordingly, 
when a pretext problem arises, if we do not like what police are doing in 
such cases, then we should ask, as Haddad would: Did police 
demonstrate the intent to rely on the doctrine in question?  And if their 
having done so does not dispel our concerns about abuse of the doctrine, 
then we should consider altering, that is, narrowing, the doctrine. 
Whren, however, is an exceedingly difficult case, highly resistant to 
evaluating what it was that police were really doing.  Assume that the 
traffic violations alluded to by Officer Soto did occur.  When Officers 
Soto and Littlejohn took the stand at the pretrial hearing where Whren 
and Brown moved to suppress the cocaine, one could have asked: What, 
if anything, was said between the officers before the stop?  Did they 
discuss the Nissan’s erratic movements?  Did they discuss their then- 
unsubstantiated suspicions about drug activity?  Did the officers explain 
the point of the stop to the driver?  If not, then why not?  Was it due to 
their being distracted?  By what?  Seeing the drugs?  Did the officers 
ultimately ticket the driver?  Why not?  Because it seemed trivial compared 
with what was discovered?  By questioning the intentions of the officers 
in this manner, we get, in their elaboration of what they were doing, a 
chance to respond to their commitment—to their going on record—when 
 
 75. Id. at 652 (footnotes omitted). 
 76. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 248–56 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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they tell us, and expect us to rely on them when they tell us, what their 
intentions were.  And despite what the U.S. Supreme Court may say, this 
inquiry into intentions is a way of determining what happened and is not 
meant to be a way of inquiring into what went on behind what happened. 
In Whren’s case, even if the police did initiate a traffic stop, in light of 
their prompt plain view sighting of a bag or bags of cocaine, there was 
good reason for their not following through on that original intention or 
plan.  The traffic stop well might have been the original plan, but it 
might have dropped out when, after undertaking that original plan, 
police saw that they had their hands on some drug offenders.77  In this 
situation, their failure to follow through—their failure to treat this as a 
traffic stop—by no means demonstrates that the stop was, at its 
inception, a drug investigation, though it may certainly give us pause. 
The difference between this case and the case of the officer who used 
the traffic laws to improve his social life has something to do with what 
changes in plan, what sorts of distractions, can count in our attempt to 
come to grips with what action the officer was performing.  In other 
words, we could ask: Was Whren a drug investigation (masquerading as 
a traffic stop), and was the officer who stopped the attractive motorist 
embarking on a social adventure (also masquerading as a traffic stop)?  
When the officers converted Whren’s traffic stop into a drug 
investigation, their overlooking the traffic offenses makes good sense 
(though it would certainly lead to their being given a hard time in the 
witness box at the suppression hearing).  After all, the plain view 
discovery of evidence that could lead to decades of imprisonment is just 
the sort of distraction to which we may expect law enforcers to yield 
when the plan began as a stop that could by itself culminate in no more 
than the issuance of a citation and summons. 
But then why suggest that the failure to pursue the traffic infractions 
in Whren “may certainly give us pause”?  Because that is a response that 
is open whenever someone says that they were doing something—here, 
enforcing the traffic laws—that is at least arguably at odds with the way 
they comported themselves.  But with the officer who asks the motorist 
for a date, we would likely be a good deal more skeptical about the basis 
of the distraction.  Why be distracted by that?  And even if the distraction 
is understandable, quite literally natural, that does not adequately explain 
 
 77. Cf. Haddad, supra note 27, at 678 n.178 (citing cases that hold that a traffic 
stop need not culminate in a citation or warning in order to be constitutional). 
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actually yielding to it, not in the context of policing.  Indeed, the basis of 
the distraction in such a case is trivial when compared to that in Whren: 
trivial, again, in light of the objectives of policing.  And even if the 
officer who asked the motorist for a date really did observe a traffic 
offense and really saw himself as committed, at first, to performing a 
traffic stop, all we have to evaluate the action is what we see in the 
public, observable world, including of course his account of it.  While it 
is perfectly plausible that the officer who asked the motorist for a date 
was every bit as committed to carrying out the original plan as the 
officers in Whren were, I am suggesting only that when his actions 
suggest a social call, it is an account that is more likely to be rejected, 
given that it is hard to count desire as a distraction in that context.  And 
the rejection would not be on the ground that it is false, but that it would 
have no real sway, not in light of what could pass for a commitment to 
enforce the traffic laws in the first instance.78 
C. The Role of Intentions in Fourth Amendment Analysis 
By now, this Article has at least begun to establish procedures by 
which people may unravel the problem posed by pretextual police 
action.  These procedures entail questioning police in order that we may 
take a position on what they were doing (confronting their intentions) as 
opposed to why they were doing it (confronting their reasons, their 
motives, their purposes).  Whren’s weakness is not that it kills off pretext 
claims—that is really no weakness at all—but that it threatens to kill off 
any meaningful evaluation of what police do.  For instance, at one point 
the Whren Court remarks that “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in 
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”79 For reasons 
that remain mysterious, this is a phrase of which the Court is particularly 
fond.80  And it is safe to say the parties only compound the problem.81 
 
 78. But cf. Haddad, Well-Delineated Exceptions, supra note 59, at 205 (suggesting 
that evidence discovered against a traffic offender who was stopped as a pretext for 
asking the driver out on a date would be less likely to be challenged by defense counsel 
as a pretext than would evidence discovered against a traffic offender who was stopped 
as a pretext for a drug investigation). 
 79. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). 
 80. E.g., United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 123 (2001) (Souter, J., 
concurring); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001); Atwater v. City of Lago 
Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 372 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); City of Indianapolis v. 
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45 (2000); Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 n.2 (2000); 
Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 604 (1998) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Bogan v. 
Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 55 (1998); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38 (1996). 
 81. E.g., Brief for the United States at 15, Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841) 
(“An inquiry into whether an officer’s action was ‘pretextual’ is inherently an inquiry 
into his subjective intent.”). 
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But what could this utterance possibly mean?  In this context the word 
“subjective” is nonsense, as it must be whenever used to modify “intention” 
or any other term of inculpation or exculpation.  In other words, there is 
no such thing as a subjective intention.  Subjective as opposed to what?  
Objective?  What would the difference denote, exactly?  Could one imagine 
any specific application of utterances such as, “His subjective intention 
was X but his objective intention was Y”?  If so, then what would it be?  
Your intention according to you (subjective) as opposed to your 
intention according to others that we may identify through laborious 
questioning (objective)?  In other words, is it to say that a subjective 
intention is a claim you make about your intentions, but an objective 
intention is a claim someone else makes about your intentions?  If so, 
then what makes others’ claims objective?  Their distance?  That is, their 
ability to know how things are with us better than we do ourselves?  So 
there really are two kinds of intentions?  That cannot be the law (or the 
grammar of “intention” either). 
When we refer to intentions, we are trying to make sense out of an action 
in a context where subjective and objective have no specific application.  
Indeed, speaking in terms of intentions as subjective or objective plays into 
one of the great myths of legal notions of responsibility: references to 
intentions are references to something inside us.82  Intentions are said to 
be subjective because they are secret “mental states,” which can only be 
inferred by others (objectively) through close observation of behavior.83  
Take this perfectly conventional and representative account from a 
leading book of criminal law theory, where legal philosopher Michael 
Moore holds: “My own intentions are usually known to me in a way 
 
 82. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989); United States Postal 
Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716–17 (1983). 
The state of a man’s mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion.  It is true 
that it is very difficult to prove what the state of a man’s mind at a particular time 
is, but if it can be ascertained it is as much a fact as anything else. 
Id. (quoting Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. D. 459, 483 (1885)). 
 83. See Richard A. Posner, So What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, in 
OVERCOMING LAW 397 (1995). 
Judges and juries do not, as a precondition to finding that a killing was 
intentional, peek into the defendant’s mind in search of the required intent.  
They look at the evidence of what the defendant did and try to infer from it 
whether there was advance planning or some other indication of a high 
probability of success, whether there was concealment of evidence or other 
indicia of likely escape, and whether the circumstances of the crime argue a 
likelihood of repetition . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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different from how they are known to a third-person observer, the latter 
having to make behavioural inferences since he lacks my first-person 
experience.”84  Moore says we must infer, a second-rate form of 
knowing, but if close enough attention is paid to the data, to the way the 
body moves and what the mind must have willed it to do, then we can 
discover this thing called the “intention.” 
This psychologizing of intentions, however, misses out on the function 
of discussions of intentions: 
Descriptions of mental events or processes are not acceptable as answers to 
questions about what our intentions are.  A request for our intentions is not a 
request for a description of something inside us, but a request for us to perform 
a certain act that requires us to go on record or to commit ourselves in a certain 
way that justifies the reliance of other persons on what we profess our intentions 
to be.85 
Indeed, Paul Gudel’s thoughtful repudiation of the prevailing view 
about human action is worth quoting at length: 
If intentions are not internal things or happenings, what are they?  What sorts of 
things can fill in for the variable in the assertion, “My intention is X”?  Most 
commonly, the place of the X is taken by a verb in the infinitive signifying an 
action or achievement.  Therefore, the most general definition of an intention is 
“an action in prospect.” 
 It is not, then, that intentions are difficult to observe or to have “direct 
evidence” of.  Intentions simply are not the sorts of things that can be observed, 
any more than one can observe the number five (not some particular written or 
printed instance of the number five, but the number itself).  This does not mean 
they are necessarily hidden; it only means that the concept of “observation” has 
no obvious application to them.  When we say something like, “The intentions 
of another cannot be directly observed,” we have no coherent idea of what it 
would mean to “observe another’s intention.”  If anything is meant by this 
phrase at all, it probably is something along the lines of “observe his intention 
as he himself observes it.”  But there is no such thing as this; there is no thing 
called “the intention” we observe by introspection just before every action we 
take.  Intentions are not observed, either by ourselves or by others. 
 We use the language of intentions, and impute intentions to persons, as a 
way of making human actions intelligible to ourselves.  We do not make actions 
intelligible to ourselves by adverting to an inner event that preceded that action.  
Our interest in human actions is not usually in how they were produced, but in 
how they can be more fully understood.  Because this is what the attribution of 
intentions does, the language of intentions has reference to the public, 
observable world, not to an inaccessible world of inner events.86 
Gudel offered this as a response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s so-called 
“mixed motives” problem in employment discrimination cases,87 but it 
 
 84. MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW 94 (1993). 
 85. Gudel, supra note 12, at 84 (footnotes omitted). 
 86. Id. at 85 (emphasis in third paragraph added). 
 87. See id. at 18. 
[I]magine a supervisor who is biased against women and who actively dislikes 
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has point in any context where questions of responsibility arise.  
References to intentions are made in order to limit responsibility by 
demanding that the accused go on record, typically by proffering an 
excuse.  That is, in asking what your intentions were, we are asking for 
an explanation of your actions, but we are not asking for you to make 
reports about something inside you, be it a mental state or any other sort 
of internal perturbation. 
So if we get rid of that misleading referent—subjective—we are left 
with the following utterance: “[I]ntentions play no role in ordinary, 
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”88  Now what?  Could the 
Court really emphasize that probable cause to stop the car was what 
made the stop impervious to criticism in Whren, but say at once that 
what police intended to do is irrelevant?  But what makes probable cause 
critical to the constitutionality of searches and seizures is that it is strongly 
suggestive that when police act on that knowledge, they do so with a 
certain intention.  If the police officers’ account of their intentions—
their going on record and telling us that we can rely on them when they 
tell us what they were doing—is irrelevant, then how would we even 
know what it was that they were doing?  How would we be able to tell 
that it was the traffic violations that occasioned the stop and not some 
unsubstantiated hunch, or racism, or spite?  Without confronting their 
intentions, we would know it was a stop sure enough, but we would not 
know if it was a traffic stop, a stop to investigate drug activity, a stop to 
kill time, or whatever.  In other words, we cannot know what to make of 
the action once it is called into question unless we take a stab at getting 
the accused to go on record about how things were with him.  Of course 
the intentions of police matter; investigating intentions and finding out 
what was done are on the same level, part of the same enterprise.  When 
we get to the suppression hearing in criminal cases, questioning police 
 
dealing with women in the workplace.  Imagine also that one of his employees 
is a woman who has her failings as an employee—perhaps she is chronically 
absent from work or achieves consistently low performance levels.  At some 
point, the supervisor fires her. 
 Now imagine that the woman sues the employer for sex discrimination and 
at trial introduces evidence that her supervisor was biased against women.  The 
employer introduces evidence that the woman was fired because she was a 
poor employee.  This is what the courts have called a “mixed motives” case.  
How do we sort out the relationship between the facts submitted by both sides 
and the employer’s decision? 
Id. 
 88. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). 
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about their intentions is essential to our evaluation of what they have 
done.  Otherwise we would not know how to respond to what happened.  
But to say, as the Court did in Whren (and has reiterated since), that the 
intentions of police are irrelevant89 is to say that our interest in what 
police have done is irrelevant.  And that much is wrong. 
But in this particular, and peculiar, utterance it is evident what the 
Court is getting at, or more accurately, what it is revealing: a view of 
intentions which casts them as internal states, the meaning of which is 
inferred through close observation.  Yet if intentions are part of the secret, 
subjective selves, then how can we ever avoid being held hostage by 
lies and indirection (“No one can tell me what I was thinking!”) except 
by, in the Whren Court’s words, “root[ing] out . . . subjective intent 
through ostensibly objective means”90 (whatever that means).  By making 
this recommendation, what the Court is responding to is the difficulty in 
knowing others, that difficulty accounting for the development of a 
doctrine that makes the hidden, secret selves—the “state of mind”91 of 
others—irrelevant whenever possible.  This, however, badly mischaracterizes 
what an intention is, which is simply a device, a way of talking about 
human action, for making action intelligible where there is some reason 
to question what was done. 
All this seems to only glance off the Court.  When the Court elaborates in 
Whren that “the Fourth Amendment’s concern with ‘reasonableness’ 
allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the 
subjective intent,”92 it is hard to get a picture of what, in the Court’s 
view, would constitute an action without an intention, subjective or 
otherwise.  By definition, an action has an intention.93  If you are pushed 
or stung by a bee or are having a seizure, then you are not acting at all; if 
you harm someone by mistake or accident, then you have acted, though 
there your intentions in one way or another misfire: you stray or 
something befalls.  In other words, an action without an intention is a 
happening or an occurrence, but not an action.94  You perform an action 
intentionally only if you have some idea of what you are doing, when 
 
 89. See cases cited supra note 80. 
 90. Whren, 517 U.S. at  814. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id.; see also Kenneth Gavsie, Note, Making the Best of “Whren”: The 
Problems with Pretextual Traffic Stops and the Need for Restraint, 50 FLA. L. REV. 385, 
387 n.22 (1998) (“[P]robable cause for any traffic violation will suffice for a reasonable 
stop regardless of an officer’s true intentions.”). 
 93. See J.L. Austin, Three Ways of Spilling Ink, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 280–81 
(J.O. Urmson & G.J. Warnock eds., 3d ed. 1979) (“I may ‘have no purpose (whatsoever)’ 
in doing something, just as I may take no care.  But I don’t ‘have no intention 
(whatsoever)’ in doing something.”). 
 94. See CARLOS J. MOYA, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION 12 (1990). 
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you are putting yourself to whatever is realized.95  J.L. Austin captures 
what he calls this “most subtle . . . notion[]” of intention when he writes: 
I must be supposed to have as it were a plan, an operation-order or something of 
the kind on which I’m acting, which I am seeking to put into effect, carry out in 
action: only of course nothing necessarily or, usually, even faintly, so full-
blooded as a plan proper.  When we draw attention to this aspect of action, we 
use the words connected with intention.96 
As Austin’s most celebrated student put it, “[Y]ou can’t be intending to 
do a thing if you don’t know you’re doing it, or rather don’t know how 
what you are doing could have that consequence (if you didn’t know 
about the child, you can’t have intended to frighten it).”97  That is, when 
committing yourself to a course of action that could be called 
intentional, you must see far enough ahead to appreciate the implications 
of your actions.  Austin likens this aspect of intentions to “a miner’s 
lamp on our forehead which illuminates always just so far ahead as we 
go along.”98  Austin is careful to note that the lamp does not illuminate 
very well or far because the circumstances under which actions take 
place dictate that even when people take care, much remains outside of 
or incidental to their intentions.99 
Thus, a police officer who does not mean to do anything at all is not 
acting, period.  Accordingly, “in assessing official responsibility for police 
acting as police, it makes good sense to require that police intend to 
investigate crime or enforce laws before they may be held responsible in 
their investigative or enforcement capacities.”100  Likewise, when we are 
confronting the question of whether a search or seizure is constitutional, we 
cannot get an accurate picture of what was done without confronting what it 
was that police were putting themselves to.  A traffic stop is characterized 
not merely by the fact that police pull someone over intentionally; that 
would demonstrate only that it was a stop.  But by claiming to foreclose 
on inquiries into police intentions, the Supreme Court threatens to 
foreclose on our telling the difference between a plan (though nothing so 
concrete as a plan) to effect a traffic stop, a drug investigation, or an 
 
 95. Austin, supra note 93, at 283. 
 96. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 97. Stanley Cavell, A Matter of Meaning It, in MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY? 
233 (1969). 
 98. Austin, supra note 93, at 284. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Daniel Yeager, “Oops!”: Inadvertence, Intentionality, and the Police, 24 
SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP. 157 (1997). 
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instance of harassment, racial or otherwise.  Evaluating the constitutionality 
of the stop entails coming to grips with the officers’ account of their 
intentions in the context of the other facts available.  And to the extent that 
the Court says otherwise—and they do—is more than a little misleading. 
IV.  ARKANSAS V. SULLIVAN: CONFRONTING THE REMNANTS OF WHREN 
In State v. Sullivan, Officer Joe Taylor, then an eleven-year veteran of 
policing in various Arkansas police departments,101 followed Kenneth 
Sullivan to a gas station in Conway, Arkansas to admonish Sullivan for 
driving forty miles per hour in a thirty-five mile-per-hour zone.102  When 
asked to produce registration and insurance documents, Sullivan opened 
his door, allowing Taylor to see that Sullivan, a disabled, unemployed 
roofer, had a rusted roofing hatchet corroding into the carpet of the 
car.103  After stopping Sullivan, Taylor “recognized him as someone that 
he had seen intelligence on regarding narcotics, and . . . rather than write 
citations, he physically arrested him”104 for speeding, failure to produce 
registration or proof of insurance, carrying a weapon (the hatchet), and 
having improperly tinted windows and a broken speedometer.105  Taylor 
performed an inventory search of the car, which revealed, inter alia, 
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia stashed in a black bag under 
the armrest.106  Sullivan was eventually charged with everything but the 
failure to produce registration and insurance.107 
The trial court granted Sullivan’s motion to suppress the drugs.108  
In a brief opinion, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed109 and then 
published its 4-3 denial of the State’s request for rehearing.110  According to 
the state’s high court, the arrest “was pretextual in nature, in that it was 
made solely for the purpose of searching [Sullivan’s] vehicle for 
controlled substances.”111 
 
 101. Hearing on Motion to Suppress at 38, State v. Sullivan (Ark. Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 
18, 1998) (No. 98-732). 
 102. State v. Sullivan, 11 S.W.3d 526, 526 (Ark. 2000), opinion supplemented on denial 
of reh’g, 16 S.W.3d 551 (Ark. 2000), and rev’d, Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001). 
 103. Id. 
 104. State v. Sullivan, 16 S.W.3d 551, 552 (Ark. 2000) (supplemental opinion on 
denial of rehearing). 
 105. Sullivan, 11 S.W.3d at 526. 
 106. Id. at 527. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Hearing on Motion to Suppress at 80–87, State v. Sullivan (Ark. Cir. Ct. filed 
Nov. 18, 1998) (No. 98-732). 
 109. Sullivan, 11 S.W.3d at 528 (mentioning Whren nowhere). 
 110. State v. Sullivan, 16 S.W.3d 551 (Ark. 2000) (supplemental opinion on denial 
of rehearing) (discussing Whren). 
 111. Sullivan, 11 S.W.3d at 527. 
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This is a correct, that is, technical use of the term “pretext,” provided 
that the Arkansas Supreme Court means that in approaching Sullivan, 
Taylor was relying on his radar gun, though his motive in enforcing 
speeding laws was to further a drug investigation that otherwise would 
not have permitted a search or seizure of Sullivan.  But as is so often the 
case, it is not clear just what is meant here by “pretext,” especially once 
the court elaborates its position.  The court continues, first by stating 
“that ‘pretext’ is a matter of the arresting officer’s intent,”112 and second, 
that pretext is a matter of evaluating “whether an ulterior motive 
prompted an arrest.”113  This ulterior motive would make the police action 
unlawful as long as the “covert motive” is “dominant” over another, that 
is, “dual,” but somehow not covert (not ulterior), motive.114 
Pretext is indeed informed by the officer’s intent and motive, if any, 
but the Arkansas Supreme Court, like the U.S. Supreme Court in Whren, 
makes no effort at all to clarify for us what the officer must, or must not, 
intend in order for the action in question to be a pretext.  Again, the 
officer’s intention is relevant to a claim of pretext: if the officer is not 
doing what the Constitution permits—if it is not a justified search or 
seizure—then it is not a pretextual action, but an unconstitutional one.  
That is, if the officer lacks the antecedent suspicion that the Constitution 
requires for the search or seizure in question, then putting himself to the 
task in such circumstances—intending to search or seize, but lacking 
the authority on these facts—makes the action plainly and simply 
unconstitutional, not pretextual. 
There is no way to know what the Arkansas Supreme Court had in 
mind in Sullivan because, rather than explicating what it meant for 
pretexts to be “a matter of the arresting officer’s intent,”115 it went on to 
state that the lawfulness of the actions in question depends on which of 
two motives dominates: the ulterior (covert?) or some other motive that 
is dual but not ulterior (or covert).  This, the so-called “mixed motive” 
problem,116 is a description of human action that has pervaded Title VII 
litigation for years and has turned out to be an unhappy-at-best way of 
talking about motives, indeed, about responsibility.117  I assume here that 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 528. 
 115. Id. at 527. 
 116. See discussion supra note 87. 
 117. See Gudel, supra note 12 (providing excellent treatment of the problem). 
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the ulterior, or covert, motive is to conduct a drug investigation, which, 
for the court, undermines or corrupts the intention to enforce the traffic 
laws.  This is indeed a pretext, provided, of course, that the officer is 
aware of the motive—that he sees himself relying on the traffic offense 
in order to pursue a drug investigation.  A person can have conscious or 
unconscious motives.118  There is no such thing, however, as an unconscious 
motive that can count as a pretext, given that “pretext” has the overtone of 
connivance or manipulation, neither of which can be done inadvertently. 
But what is the other motive the court has in mind, the one that makes 
the motives dual?  Here I assume it to be the “motive” to enforce the 
traffic laws.  But that could not be the motive for enforcing the traffic 
laws any more than racial discrimination could be the motive for an act 
of racial discrimination.  If an officer is enforcing the traffic laws for the 
usual reasons (sense of duty, boredom, angling for a promotion), or for 
no reason at all (he just felt like it), then there is no motive for his 
actions, ulterior or otherwise.  This is not to say that two motives could 
not operate in the same case.  They could: the officer stops a speeding 
motorist on good probable cause both to ask the motorist out for a date 
and to facilitate a drug investigation.  Please note that both objectives 
here fit the criteria of motives.  They have that directedness (not 
inwardness) that a motive must have and are outside of, or incompatible 
with, the conventional aim (if any) of the action.  Traffic stops are not 
social calls and drug investigations are justified by suspicion of drug 
activity, not of bad driving. 
Although the Arkansas Supreme Court’s compressed opinion tells us 
little about pretexts and their relation to intentions and motives, the 
court’s opinion bears a striking resemblance to the approach that 
Attorney Wright took for her clients, Whren and Brown.  Wrapping up 
its decision to affirm the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence 
found in Sullivan’s car, the court explained: 
The question then becomes whether appellee would have been arrested simply 
for traveling forty miles per hour in a thirty-five mile-per-hour zone and 
possessing a roofing hatchet that had clearly been in his vehicle for quite a long 
time, given that it was corroding into the carpet.  We find that to be doubtful.  
His vehicle may have been impounded due to his failure to provide proof of 
insurance and registration.  However, appellee was never charged with having 
no proof of insurance or vehicle registration.119 
 
 118. LAWRENCE, supra note 21, at 10 (“[I]magine that a particularly memorable 
abomination of Caligula’s afforded his assassin a motive to kill him, yet that the man 
struck in ignorance of that reason but for a different one (say, because Caligula had made 
his horse a priest).  Or, what is less likely, for no reason.”). 
 119. Sullivan, 11 S.W.3d at 528.  Although the Arkansas Supreme Court emphasized 
that Sullivan was an unemployed roofer, that the hatchet was for roofing, and that the 
hatchet was rusted into the carpet, the suppression hearing transcript reveals, as well, that 
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Would Officer Taylor have arrested Sullivan based merely on the 
traffic offenses and the roofing hatchet?  This is what Attorney Wright 
had pressed the U.S. Supreme Court to adopt as the standard in 
Whren.120  When asked by Sullivan’s attorney, Taylor insisted not only 
that he would have, but also that, as a Class A misdemeanor, possession 
of a weapon required arrest in order to assure that the offender be 
fingerprinted.121  He even indicated, rather reluctantly, that his decisions 
to arrest rather than cite depend generally in part on how productive a 
shift he has had.122  But the vices of such a line of questioning deeply 
outweigh its virtues.  Now that Taylor has been asked what role the 
hatchet played in the arrest, now what?  Would it help if defense counsel 
could point to similar cases in which that officer did not arrest the 
suspect?123  All that would prove is that discretion operates in policing, 
but that is by no means a condemnation of it.  Again, what matters is 
whether the traffic laws were being enforced, not why.124 
 
the hatchet was over a foot long and was found on the narrow strip of carpet between the 
driver’s seat and door—hardly the place one would store tools.  Hearing on Motion to 
Suppress at 41–42, State v. Sullivan (Ark. Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 18, 1998) (No. 98-732). 
 120. See Brief for the Petitioners at 31, Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 
(1996) (No. 95-5841). 
The question that has divided the lower courts is what standard of objective 
justification applies when the defendant alleges that the asserted basis for a 
search or seizure was a pretext to evade applicable Fourth Amendment 
constraints.  Although this Court has never had to decide that question, its 
precedents and the purposes of the Fourth Amendment support the rule that 
such intrusions are unreasonable if they deviate so far from standard police 
practices that a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would not have 
made the intrusion on the basis asserted.  This standard prohibits arbitrary 
intrusions without “immunizing” defendants suspected of greater crimes from 
stops that would otherwise have been made. 
Id. 
 121. Hearing on Motion to Suppress at 59, 62, State v. Sullivan (Ark. Cir. Ct. filed 
Nov. 18, 1998) (No. 98-732). 
 122. Id. at 57–58. 
 123. In fact, Sullivan’s counsel did just that.  Id. at 61–65. 
 124. This is not to say that there are no impermissible reasons for police action.  A 
discriminatory stop would violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.  
Nonetheless, such stops based on race, national origin, gender, alienage, or “legitimacy,” 
while unconstitutional, do not have what one could call a “discriminatory motive.”  
Rather, they are plainly and simply, discriminatory actions.  See, e.g., Gudel, supra note 
12, at 79. 
[I]t is not clear what a “discriminatory motive” is. . . . 
  If discriminatory acts do have motives, they would have to be motives other 
than those such as “racial bias.”  Moreover, discriminatory acts may be 
performed without a “discriminatory motive.”  An employer’s motive for 
refusing to hire more blacks could be that his customers might refuse to deal 
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Indeed, the second half of the passage quoted above hints at this 
essential condition of evaluating police responsibility.  If the search of 
the car had been to inventory its contents for administrative purposes, 
then we would need to know what, under Arkansas law, justifies an 
inventory search.  Arkansas law holds, “A vehicle impounded in 
consequence of an arrest, or retained in official custody for other good 
cause, may be searched at such times and to such extent as is reasonably 
necessary for safekeeping of the vehicle and its contents.”125  In addition, 
police “shall inventory the passenger compartment of said vehicle and 
any other area of said vehicle for the purpose of protecting any valuables 
which may be found in said vehicle,” but that “any locked containers 
found within the vehicle shall be . . . noted” as locked.126 
One can see what the Arkansas Supreme Court was worried about 
here: if the inventory search was justified by an arrest for failure to 
produce registration and insurance, then it seems a little fishy that 
prosecutors never charged Sullivan with the very offense that is said to 
have justified the search.  Still, the fact that prosecutors never followed 
up on the case that police began tells us almost nothing,127 even if the 
failure to produce registration and insurance was the only lawful basis 
for the inventory search, which it was not.  According to Arkansas law, 
 
with him if he had a largely black work force.  This is not a discriminatory 
motive, except in the tautological and therefore completely uniformative and 
irrelevant sense of “whatever motive a discriminatory act had.”  But it does not 
matter that this employer’s motive is not discriminatory, because the act is a 
discriminatory one, and therefore illegal, regardless of its motive. 
Id. 
 125. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 12.6(b). 
 126. See Memorandum from Timothy P. Daley, Chief of Police, Conway Police 
Department, to Conway Police Department Personnel (July 25, 1994) (presented as 
State’s Exhibit No. 1, Hearing on Motion to Suppress at 88, State v. Sullivan (Ark. Cir. 
Ct. filed Nov. 18, 1998) (No. 98-732)).  This likely complies with the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s injunction in Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990), which demanded that police 
departmental inventory procedures take a position on whether or which closed containers 
discovered in the car may be searched.  Id. at 4.  Recall that in Sullivan, the drugs were 
found in a closed container, a black bag, under the armrest.  State v. Sullivan, 11 S.W.3d 
526, 527 (Ark. 2000), opinion supplemented on denial of reh’g, 16 S.W.3d 551 (Ark. 
2000), and rev’d, Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001). 
 127. Cf. J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 44 (J.O. Urmson & Marisa 
Sbisà eds., 2d ed. 1975). 
I must, of course, have the intention, if I am not to be insincere, at the time of 
my utterance: but what exactly is the degree or mode of the infelicity if I do 
not afterwards do it?  Or again, in ‘I bid you welcome’, to say which is to 
welcome, intentions of a kind are presumably vaguely necessary: but what if 
one then behaves churlishly?  Or again, I give you advice and you accept it, 
but then I round on you: how far is it obligatory on me not to do so?  Or am I 
just ‘not expected’ to do so?: or is part of asking-and-taking advice definitely 
to make such subsequent conduct out of order?  Or similarly, I entreat you to 
do something, you accede, and then I protest—am I out of order?  Probably yes. 
Id. 
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which for now128 reflects the U.S. Supreme Court’s view as well,129 any 
offense is arrestable.  But the court’s point here, though it is certainly not 
made explicit, is that not all arrests necessarily make the car in which the 
arrestee is found subject to impoundment.  As sensible as that limitation 
may be, nothing in Arkansas law suggests that only some arrests can 
trigger the inventory procedure.130 
This rather broad power to arrest allowed Officer Taylor to arrest 
Sullivan for offenses that Taylor (or his employer) had no interest in 
pursuing.  The majority suspected that, instead, the pretextual arrest was 
made with the motive of exploiting a rather broad power to conduct a 
thorough inventory search of the car.  Indeed, though the Arkansas Supreme 
Court took no note, Whren itself distinguished three of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s own precedents, which insist that administrative searches, 
including inventory searches, “must not be a ruse for a general 
rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.”131 
In response to the State’s request for a rehearing, the Arkansas Supreme 
Court elaborated that the stop was justified by the radar gun, but that in 
arresting Sullivan and coming up with the weapons charge, Officer 
Taylor had not comported himself “appropriate[ly].”132  The court did 
not elaborate.  Positing that Whren does not go 
 
 128. See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 4.1(a)(iii).  On remand to the Arkansas Supreme Court, 
the parties briefed whether Arkansas law places any limitations on police officers’ power 
to arrest for trivial offenses and pretextual police action that the U.S. Constitution does 
not.  See Appellees’ Motion to Rebrief Issues on Remand from U.S. Supreme Court, 
Sullivan, 11 S.W.3d 526 (No. 99-1140). 
 129. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). 
 130. See, e.g., Mounts v. State, 888 S.W.2d 321, 324 (Ark. Ct. App. 1994); Folly v. 
State, 771 S.W.2d 306, 310–11 (Ark. Ct. App. 1989) (noting that inventory searches can 
occur (1) before the impoundment, (2) without regard for whether alternatives to impoundment 
are feasible, or (3) whether the car is lawfully parked). 
 131. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811 (1996) (quoting Florida v. Wells, 
495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990); see id. (quoting Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987) 
(approving inventory search because there was “no showing that the police, who were 
following standardized procedures, acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of 
investigation”)); id. (quoting New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 717 n.27 (1987) 
(upholding administrative inspection of junkyard because search did not appear to be “a 
‘pretext’ for obtaining evidence of . . . violation of . . . penal laws”)). 
 132. State v. Sullivan, 16 S.W.3d 551, 552 (Ark. 2000) (supplemental opinion on 
denial of rehearing); Hearing on Motion to Suppress at 81, State v. Sullivan (Ark. Cir. 
Ct. filed Nov. 18, 1998) (No. 98-732). 
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so far as to sanction conduct where a police officer can trail a targeted vehicle 
with a driver merely suspected of criminal activity, wait for the driver to exceed 
the speed limit by one mile per hour, arrest the driver for speeding, and conduct 
a full-blown inventory search of the vehicle with impunity,133 
the court denied the State’s request.  It is one thing, the court concluded, 
for someone like Whren to be arrested when police see him with cocaine 
in his lap; it is another thing altogether to “effect[] a pretextual arrest for 
purposes of a search, such as we have in the instant case.”134  Anything 
in Whren that could be read otherwise is, in the Arkansas Supreme 
Court’s opinion, dicta. 
In his dissent, Justice Glaze pointed out that Sullivan had committed a 
series of violations, which Taylor explained to him were the basis of his 
arrest.135  Without worrying whether the hatchet really was a weapon,136 
Justice Glaze added that Arkansas law permits arrests even for minor 
traffic infractions and permits inventory searches incident thereto.137  He 
agreed with the majority that Whren prohibits police from stalking 
motorists until they commit an infraction.138  Evidently, it mattered to 
Justice Glaze that Sullivan was not suspected as a drug dealer until 
Taylor recognized him after the stop.  Why this mattered he did not say.  
Nonetheless, Justice Glaze relied on a U.S. Supreme Court case that 
ruled that “a traffic-violation arrest would not be rendered invalid by the 
fact that it was ‘a mere pretext for a narcotics search.’”139  To hold 
otherwise, he concluded, “will generate considerable confusion among 
the rank and file of law enforcement, the bench, and the bar alike.”140 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for certiorari 
and reversed.141  In a short, per curiam opinion, the Court insisted that 
the Arkansas Supreme Court had ruled “flatly contrary” to Whren.142  
Specifically intending to re-establish Whren as the controlling precedent 
in cases like these, the Court reiterated its “unwilling[ness] to entertain 
Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual motivations of 
individual officers,” and that “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in 
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”143  Nothing more 
 
 133. Sullivan, 16 S.W.3d at 552. 
 134. Id. at 553. 
 135. Id. (Glaze, J., dissenting). 
 136. Id. at 554. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 554–55. 
 139. Id. at 555 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n.1 (1973)). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001). 
 142. Id. at 771. 
 143. Id. at 771–72 (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)) 
(alterations in original). 
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was said.144  Justice Ginsburg concurred separately, joined by Justices 
Stevens, O’Connor, and Breyer.  She emphasized that while the Court did 
not answer the state high court’s concerns about whether police could 
stalk a motorist hoping for a traffic infraction, arrest the motorist, and 
search incident to that arrest, Whren’s ban on pretextual claims certainly 
makes that very strategy perfectly constitutional.145  That the four 
concurring Justices, who have come to accept that implication of Whren 
as the law of the land, find it nonetheless regrettable is manifest. 
What happened here?  Why, given that at least seven times since 
Whren was decided the Court in criminal cases has declaimed the 
irrelevancy of intentions, motivations, and other subjective matters,146 
would the Court have to decide yet another case to establish this already 
well-established, oft-uttered, proposition?  What should the Arkansas courts 
have seen that they did not?  And perhaps more importantly, if Sullivan 
was decided in order to straighten out a misconception about the meaning of 
Whren, then what exactly has been straightened out by Sullivan? 
By now it should be evident that what went wrong in the Arkansas 
Supreme Court owes to Whren.  Not even certain what to count as 
relevant, the state high court was convinced that what Officer Taylor had 
done was fishy, but it could not seem to find a way to voice what, 
exactly, he had done wrong.  If Taylor’s actions were in fact not 
appropriate,147 then what made them so?  What would have legitimated 
them?  A different motive?  What sort of motive would that be?  As for 
the dissenters, crucial to their position was that Sullivan’s drug activity 
was a surprise to police, at least until he was pulled over.  But that fact, 
without more, neither makes nor breaks the State’s case. 
Ultimately, what went wrong in the Arkansas Supreme Court was not so 
much the result, but the way it was reached—by a complete failure to see 
the difference between intentions and motives, that is, between action and a 
very particular sort of reason for action.  That failure is what doomed the 
 
 144. The Court seemed so intent in slapping down the lower court that it appears 
not to have noticed that the case presented the intriguing issue of whether the Bertine 
exception to the pretext-is-irrelevant rule would permit challenge of a vehicle inventory 
made possible only by a post-arrest impoundment itself linked to a pretextual arrest.  
Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment as a “Big Time” TV Fad, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 
265, 270 n.17 (2001); see supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 145. Sullivan, 532 U.S. at 772–73 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 146. See cases cited supra note 80. 
 147. State v. Sullivan, 16 S.W.3d 551, 552 (Ark. 2000) (supplemental opinion on 
denial of rehearing). 
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state court’s attempt to distinguish some constitutional from unconstitutional 
police practices.  And given Whren’s having established that (1) subjective 
intentions play no role in Fourth Amendment analysis, (2) subjective 
intentions and actual motivations evidently are the same phenomenon, and 
(3) nothing matters but probable cause, it is certainly safe to say that both 
the majority and the dissenters in the Arkansas Supreme Court were doing 
their best to follow an impenetrable law of the land. 
But what has Sullivan done to correct what was flatly contrary to the 
law of the land?  Reiterated the law of the land?  But that threatens only 
to perpetuate the problem, that “considerable confusion” of which 
Justice Glaze wrote.148  Indeed, the courts that have employed Sullivan 
thus far have continued to interpret it in different ways,149 most of them 
perfectly plausible in light of the way the compressed opinion was drafted.  
Simply put, nothing has been straightened out.  Sullivan seems more to 
have pointed to Whren than to have explicated it.  By reiterating its 
“unwilling[ness] to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges based on the 
actual motivations of individual officers” and that “[s]ubjective intentions 
play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis,”150 
the Court not only fulfilled its goal of deleting pretexts from Fourth 
Amendment discourse, but also incidentally banned any reference to 
intentions.  This, in turn, would have the effect of foiling any attempt to 
understand what happened in any given case.  Based on the cases that 
already allude to Sullivan, the problem is not going to go away, not until 
it is made clearer just what pretexts are.  Since neither Whren nor 
Sullivan established the criteria of pretexts, pretexts will continue to 
plague constitutional criminal procedure. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
It is not so much the stubbornness of defense counsel or of courts that 
accounts for the tendency of pretext arguments to somehow continue to 
rehabilitate themselves.  The U.S. Supreme Court keeps enjoining such 
arguments from Fourth Amendment discourse, but it is difficult to abide 
by an injunction whose terms you do not comprehend.  The situation is 
 
 148. See supra text accompanying note 139. 
 149. United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1286 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 
122 S. Ct. 1950 (2002); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565–67 & n.11 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002); Jefferson v. United States, 776 A.2d 576, 580 (D.C. 2001); United States v. 
Page, 154 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1319 (M.D. Tenn. 2001); United States v. Robinson, 56 
M.J. 541, 545–46 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2001); People v. Patterson, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
896, 900 (Ct. App. 2001); Powell v. State, 776 A.2d 700, 714 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2001); People v. Robinson, 767 N.E.2d 638, 641–42 & n.1 (N.Y. 2001); State v. Lamont, 
631 N.W.2d 603, 610 (S.D. 2001). 
 150. United States v. Whren, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (alterations in original). 
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far from hopeless, however.  To see that pretext arguments posit that 
police acted with a particular motive, a motive known to them, would 
make possible our seeing as well that to call something a pretext is to 
acknowledge that the action was indeed constitutional.  But getting to 
the point that we accept that the action in question really was 
constitutional requires a confrontation with the officer’s account of his 
intentions, a confrontation that the U.S. Supreme Court, in both Whren 
and Sullivan, threatens to preclude. 
The Justices’ concerns about subjectivity would be well founded if 
such inquiries really did require mind reading—encounters with inner, 
hidden, secret selves.  If that is what confrontations with intentions entail, as 
so often it is suggested they do,151 then they should be enjoined.  But 
confrontations with intentions are not attempts to penetrate privacy; they 
are attempts to evoke responses about how things were with the person 
whose intentions we question.  And by asking that they explain how 
things were with them—what they were doing, what the plan was, what 
remained incidental, what went wrong—we are asking them to elaborate 
the public, observable world when we feel the need to make sense of an 
action that strikes us as unusual or untoward.  Without leaving room in 
constitutional criminal procedure for so central, so homely an activity as 
the proffering of an excuse, we impede the entire project of regulating 
police, whose actions can be neither meaningfully praised nor meaningfully 
blamed if they cannot be understood. 
By arguing here for the relevance, even centrality, of intentions in any 
regime directed at regulating the police, I am not suggesting that motives 
themselves are hidden or inner and should, for that reason, be banished 
from criminal-procedure discourse.  They are not.  Motives themselves 
are directed in a way that they can be assessed, given that they tend to 
culminate in the realization or setting up of a plan.  It is not, therefore, 
that motives are interior any more than intentions are.  The problem with 
motives, that is, what accounts for their irrelevancy to evaluations of 
human action, is that motives are by definition external to the action: 
their “directedness” points the actor at other actions, other plans, other 
 
 151. See, e.g., Diana Roberto Donahoe, “Could Have,” “Would Have:” What the 
Supreme Court Should Have Decided in Whren v. United States, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1193, 1200–01 (1997) (“Although pretext, by definition, entails an assessment of motive, 
the Supreme Court has clearly held that an inquiry into the officer’s subjective state of 
mind is inappropriate.  This rule makes sense when one considers the difficulty of 
reading the officer’s mind as he makes quick decisions on the street.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
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upshots.  And given that in moral discourse, be it in the context of law or in 
garden-variety settings, we are generally more concerned with what 
people are doing than why they are doing it (what they hope to get out of 
it), the U.S. Supreme Court is correct to deeply discount the importance 
of motives in evaluations of police practices.  What is left now is only to 
see the extent to which the criteria of motives diverge from those of 
intentions; to acknowledge as much is essential in assessing whether a 
search or seizure is pretextual as opposed to unconstitutional, a serious 
matter for the Fourth Amendment. 
 
 
